In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United Nations Security Council acted quickly and laid the cornerstone of an international framework for combating terrorism. Twenty years later, it is high time to rethink them all.

At the time, the Security Council forced states to deny terrorists safe haven and material support through resolution 1373. The resolution is still unique in its scope, with no limits to its application in terms of groups, geography or time. To help move it forward, members of the Security Council created the Counterterrorism Directorate, or CTED. They visited over 100 countries to assess compliance and needs, and identified gaps and challenges in their counterterrorism frameworks.

In the years that followed, despite attempts at reform, the UN’s counterterrorism architecture became increasingly Byzantine, even the states that put it in place are sometimes not clear on the set of rules. and the processes that govern its functions. Today, while the UN has many useful tools to deal with the evolving terrorist threat, the complexity of form and process means that few can find them when they are needed most. .

Many UN counterterrorism efforts intersect with thematic and country-specific sanctions and UN mission mandates, but are often dealt with in complete isolation from each other. In the early years, tensions around the approach of the “global war on terror” brought in many pockets of the UN and other key offices dealing with political affairs, peacekeeping and development. to resist the counterterrorism efforts of the member body. Fast forward, and now there are criticisms of too much counterterrorism in UN affairs. But spend a month watching the work of the Security Council, and the disconnect is clear between the many violent conflicts on the body’s agenda – often including the fight against terrorism – and the rhetoric. The resources and information that UN bodies like the CTED or the Al Qaeda and ISIL Sanctions Monitoring Team bring together are seldom taken into account in the country-specific discussions of Security Council members, partly because most states are reluctant to publish their CTED assessment reports.

Another body, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office, or UNOCT, was later established to provide a single, high-level focal point for multilateral counterterrorism efforts. It sits at the peak of a broad capacity-building activity, much of which remains opaque to all except those willing to navigate lengthy UN briefings or reports, which offer little information about the impact of such activity. Although the office has been responsive to the demands and expectations of many UN member states, it is still unclear to what extent its activities are aligned with the urgent needs and gaps in the fight against terrorism, as reported. in CTED assessments or frameworks established by the Security Council. Similar activities in many other UN agencies risk duplicating efforts and creating confusion as to their limits and responsibilities, especially for longer-term programming. In addition, the UN regular budget allocates little money to the office, leaving UNOCT vulnerable to donor requests, rather than being able to establish an independent long-term plan.

For two decades, the United Nations has also been entrusted with the thankless and unattractive task of forging international legal and political cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Bodies like the CTED and the monitoring team have pushed states to increase awareness of terrorist threats, including nuanced dimensions such as the role of women, new funding methods, the role of emerging technologies and issues such as as biometrics, battlefield evidence and critical infrastructure protection. For many Member States, the guidance and support provided by the UN provides important resources for capacity development.

There is therefore no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater. But in order to assess whether or how the United Nations is able to deal with evolving terrorist threats, such as transnational far-right extremism, it is essential that the United Nations system focus on identifying what has worked, what has not worked and how States can better use existing tools and instruments to address the threats they face.

It is a universally recognized truth that a UN body once established is difficult to change. However, in the aftermath of September 11, states took extraordinarily creative steps by creating a body like CTED, the only UN special political mission based at headquarters. Counterterrorism sanctions regimes have also been adapted by states to reflect the realities of the day, for example, the Taliban sanctions regime was separated from the broader “1267” counterterrorism sanctions in 2011. This was important because it created an environment conducive to negotiations. with the Taliban and encouraged their engagement with the international community; however, the sanctions remain in place, potentially complicating any foreign cooperation with the new Taliban government on the fight against terrorism and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

As geopolitical dynamics change and new conflicts emerge or reappear, the terrorist threat will change. It will continue to grow online, fueled by disinformation and conspiracy theories, and offline in places like Afghanistan where it will be more difficult to follow the terrorist threat without eyes and ears on the ground. To reject the UN and all it could offer is to neglect a precious resource; keeping it as it is because of inertia can be called negligence.

In the short term, States should reassess the mandates and work of the CTED, the Monitoring Team and the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan; these negotiations should reflect the complex intersections of threats and opportunities in Afghanistan and the region beyond. In the medium to long term, it is time to take a close look at the UN’s counterterrorism architecture and ensure that its resources, while minimal compared to those of many large states, are effectively used to deal with the challenges. threats today, not 20 years ago. .

Naureen Chowdhury Fink is Executive Director of the Soufan Center.